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croeconomic and sectoral efficiency, of the real exchange rate, or 
is it also a social question? So far, the specialized literature has 
ignored the problem of equity in the determination of countries' 
competitiveness. It has then not been able to fully explain the 
observed competitiveness, however. In this article, equity is in-
corporated into the production function and also into investors' 
decisions in a world of perfect mobility of capital. The predic-
tions of the proposed theoretical system are generally consistent 
with the data observed in the world economy. In particular, Latin 
American displays the highest degree of inequality of all the 
regions of the world, yet its share of foreign direct investment 
flows is low, and so is its share of world trade (its competitive-
ness). The theory presented here and the data assembled suggest 
that the relative levels of productivity of countries depend in a 
positive manner on the allocation of investments, and this alloca-
tion in turn depends, likewise in a positive manner, on the degree 
of equity prevailing in the countries. The competitiveness of a 
country therefore depends, among other factors, on its degree of 
economic inequality. Societies compete in the capital market, 
seeking to attract private investment in order to make themselves 
competitive in the goods market, and this is influenced, among 
other factors, by their current degree of equity. 
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I 
Introduction 
International competitiveness is a favorite topic in 
the recent economic literature. As KrUgman (1995) 
says, there seems to be a dangerous obsession with 
this question. It is believed that there is a relation 
between differences in productivity -the basis for 
competitiveness- and national standards of living: a 
relation which Krugman finds unacceptable from 
both the logical and the empirical point of view, 
since it means that a country's standard of living 
would depend on its own productivity (i.e., on its 
absolute productivity) rather than its relative produc-
-tivity. 
What can we say about the relation between 
competitiveness and equity? Can it be that equity 
also depends only on absolute productivity and is 
therefore independent of relative levels of productiv-
ity, that is to say, of competitiveness? Or is it the 
other way round: competitiveness depends upon the 
degree of equity of the society in question? There is 
The competitiveness of a country may be defined as 
its capacity to win positions in the different interna-
tional markets. The theory is that in the long term this 
capacity depends on the relative productivity of the 
country. But what are the factors that determine a 
country's productivity? A number of theoretical hy-
potheses may be suggested here in this respect. 
G This study was initiated in the Regional Office of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO) in Lima towards the end of 
1995, in response to an invitation by Víctor Tokman. A number 
of colleagues have offered valuable comments on its successive 
versions. Thanks are due in this respect to David Drukker, Javier 
Iguifiiz, Ricardo Infante, Félix Jiménez, José Oscátegui and John 
Sheehan, and in particular to Oscar AHimir. I should also like to 
express my thanks to the panel of commentators at the Latin 
American Studies Association (LASA) meeting at Guadalajara, 
17-19 April 1997, at which this study was presented for the 
first time. It goes without saying that any errors are entirely 
the responsibility of the author. 
abundant economic literature which analyses equity 
and competitiveness separately, but there are very 
few studies on the interrelations between them. This 
arucleseeks to make some progress in this field. 
The productivity of a country is an important 
factor in its competitiveness on international markets. 
What is the relation between productivity and equity, 
however? In order to answer this question, which is 
central to the present study, a theory of production is 
developed here in which equity is a variable of the 
production function (section II); the logic followed 
by investors with regard to country risk is analysed 
(section III); empirical tests are made of the pre-
dictions of the theoretical system (section IV); the 
role of the natural resources endowment is ana-
lysed (section V); and finally, some conclusions are 
put forward and the prospects opened up by the 
equity-competitiveness relation are summarized 
(section VI). 
First, productivity depends on the entire system 
of production. As may be deduced from Leontief's 
technological system, the productivity of one sector 
cannot be independent of the productivity of the 
other sectors. The road infrastructure, transport serv-
ices, ports and communications services aré factors 
which also influence the productivity of the system 
of production. This has been acknowledged in a 
number of studies carried out in Latin America. 
Thus, the ECLAC study on changing production pat-
terns with social equity (ECLAC, 1990) considers that 
productivity is a systemic matter. Indeed, if it is con-
sidered that there are interrelations between the 
sectors in a system of production -like those in 
Leontief's technological system- this conclusion is 
beyond question. Even the concept of "factor inten-
sity" must be defined in relation to the total content 
(direct and indirect) of capital and labour per unit of 
II 
Equity and productivity 
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product, and not just in relation to the direct coeffi-
cients, as is usually done. 
Second, the productivity of the economy will 
depend not only on the intensity of the factors of 
production, but also on the changes in the quality 
of those factors and in technological knowledge. 
Third, productivity also depends on the quality 
of the entrepreneurs. This is perhaps the most signifi-
cant limiting factor. What are needed are entrepre-
neurs who continually review their methods of 
production and adopt the new technological develop-
ments generated outside the firm, as well as new 
products. But there is also a need, and indeed a press-
ing need, for "Schumpeterian entrepreneurs" who de-
velop new methods of production with new practices 
and inputs, new products, new markets and new 
sources of inputs. And as the institutional framework 
within which firms operate is also important for effi-
ciency, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are also needed 
in the public sector in order to generate institutional 
innovations to allow the production system to raise 
its level of productivity-
The factors mentioned so far have already been 
dealt with in the economic literature. In this study, 
however, a new theoretical proposition will be intro-
duced: that productivity depends on investment, and 
investment depends on social and political stability, 
which, in turn, depends on the degree of equity 
reached by society. The challenge, then, is to bring 
equity into the production function and subsequently 
prove this theory empirically. 
In order to initiate our argument, we will postu-
late a production function of the following form: 
Q^fd^S^ZJ (1) 
Where Qt is the amount of a good produced in 
the period t, L is the number of workers used in the 
same period, 5 is a vector representing the stock of 
private factors of production -land, physical capital 
and human capital (labour of different levels of skills)— 
and Z is a vector representing the stock of public 
factors of production, with both types of stocks being 
measured at the end of the preceding period. 
We thus bring "public goods" into the produc-
tion function. This set of goods includes not only 
infrastructure and public domain know-how (i.e., 
know-how that can be appropriated) but also social 
order. It is assumed that social order is a public good: 
once it is present, nobody can be excluded from its 
benefits. Social order is brought into the produc-
tion function because without social order the pro-
duction process cannot be repeated time after time, 
using the same amount of inputs for the same 
amount of product. 
These stocks are accumulated through private in-
vestment and public investment. We will assume that 
such investments require one period in order to accu-
mulate the corresponding stocks, so they are shown 
with a lag of one period in the production function. 
We will also assume that private and public invest-
ments incorporate technological innovations and give 
rise to the accumulation of both old and new produc-
tion goods. It is therefore not possible to add vectors 
from periods which are different by one number 
(and call the result "amount of capital"), since they 
include stocks of production goods (physical and 
human capital) which are heterogeneous and of 
changing qualities. 
In view of the logical difficulties raised by the 
problem of adding capital in a dynamic economy, the 
production function could be expressed only in terms 
of the relation between the product and the number 
of workers: a relation which changes continually 
with investment. This is the formulation which we 
will use here. 
If we accept the idea that the social order should 
form part of the production function, then what are 
the factors that determine the social order? In another 
study (Figueroa, 1993), the theory has been put for-
ward that the social order depends essentially on the 
degree of equity in the distribution of wealth. The 
axiomatic proposition is that not all kinds of distribu-
tion of wealth are socially tolerated. Only a strict 
subset of the possible distributions of wealth would 
be socially accepted; if the functioning of the 
economy led to a solution which lay outside these 
limits, society would enter into a distributive crisis, 
that is to say, into social disorder. 
A distributive crisis depends not only on the 
distributive results of the market, but also on the 
redistributive policy of the State. Public social expen-
diture would be one of the mechanisms available to 
the State for reducing the distributive gaps arising 
from the functioning of the market and thus ensuring 
social order. 
A growing impoverishment of the broad masses 
of the population (either absolute or relative) which 
brought society to a situation of distributive crisis 
would give rise to new forms of redistribution in 
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which the rights of ownership were no longer fully 
respected. In such a situation, non-contractual in-
come would take on increasing importance. As a re-
sult, there would be an increase in the levels of 
violence, corruption and uncertainty in the system of 
production. All this would entail economic costs for 
society. In the short term, there would be an increase 
in the cost of personal security and protection of 
property and in the costs due to stoppages on account 
of strikes and all kinds of social disorders. These 
costs would be passed on to the production costs of 
firms. Part of the social costs would thus be trans-
formed into higher unit costs for the latter, with a 
consequent loss of competitiveness. 
In the long term, the economic costs of a dis-
tributive crisis would include a retraction in private 
investment (to which we shall refer later on) and also 
a decline in the quality of labour. With the pauperiza-
tion of the masses, for example, infant malnutrition 
increases, and it is well known that the learning ca-
pacity of human beings is largely determined in their 
early infancy, so that the quality of tomorrow's la-
bour force is actually being determined today. It will 
therefore be much more costly to raise the productiv-
ity of workers who did not receive proper care in 
their infancy. The rates of grade repetition and mor-
bidity would be higher, and as a result the investment 
in education and health needed to obtain a particular 
type of labour force would also be higher. 
In short, our theoretical proposition is that pro-
ductivity depends, among other factors, on the stabil-
ity of society, which depends in turn on the degree of 
economic equity existing in society: if the degree of 
equity goes down, there will be a greater risk of sink-
ing into social and political instability and the system 
of production will display lower productivity. Equity 
(£) is an element in the production function of the 
various kinds of goods. 
In the short term, with given stocks of private 
and public goods and a given level of technological 
knowledge, the production function may be written 
as follows: 
Qt = nF(l) (2) 
where n = n(E) and where 
n = I if Et E* 
0 <n < 1 if E<E* 
There is a distributive crisis when equity (E) 
has a value below the threshold of social tolerance 
of inequality (£*). In this case, enterprises would 
have to use resources to protect private property and 
also to reduce their transaction costs (understood as 
the higher risks associated with labour interchange, 
that is to say, greater mistrust in labour relations), 
which will have risen. In a situation of distributive 
crisis, labour productivity would fall and the curve 
describing function F of equation (2) would shift 
downward.1 
In the long term, the production function can be 
expressed as follows: 
Q, = m,F(L) (3) 
where m > 1. 
Let us assume that the function F can only move 
upward, in accordance with the value of the variable 
m. Labour productivity would thus depend on the 
values assumed by the variable m. 
What are the factors that determine m? We 
propose the hypothesis that the variables that move 
the function F are private investment (/) and public 
investment (G), since these are the factors that ex-
pand the stock of private and public factors of pro-
duction. Let us assume that the new technological 
know-how obtained through investment is incorpo-
rated both in physical capital and in human capital. 
We then have: 
«», = 0 dr G J (4) 
We will assume that public investment is deter-
mined exogenously, ' but private investment will be 
considered endogenous. From the relations presented 
so far, it may be seen that in the long term labour 
productivity depends on investment, since this shifts 
function F continually upward. 
1
 By replacing equity with real wages, we can express in a more 
analytical manner what has been termed the theory of "effi-
ciency wages" (Solow, 1990). If real wages were to fall below a 
certain threshold level, labour productivity would fall. Accord-
ing to this theory, labour productivity depends on the level of 
real wages (and not the reverse, as conventional microeconomic 
theory maintains). 
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III 
The logic followed by Investors 
What are the factors that determine long-term private 
investment in a country, however? We need a theory 
of investment. 
There are as many as three different theories on 
long-term private investment: the first one holds that 
investment is endogenous to the economic process; 
the second, that it is endogenous to both the economic 
and socio-political processes, and the third, that it is 
totally exogenous. In the first case, the theory holds 
that private investment depends on the expected in-
terest rates and yields, which depend only on ex-
pected relative prices (Barro, 1990). The second theory 
brings in the assumption that the expected yields also 
depend on the degree of stability of the socio-political 
system (Alesina and Perotti, 1993; Figueroa, 1993). 
In the third theory, investors would only be guided by 
their "animal spirits", as Keynes put it. 
In this article, we will adopt the second theory. 
We will assume that investment decisions depend not 
only on the economic process but also on the socio-
political process of society, that is to say, on the 
social order. Adopting the third theory would mean 
assuming that economic growth depends only on the 
state of mind of capitalists, so that there would be 
nothing to be done in terms of economic policy. 
We will take it, then, that in the light of the risks 
facing an investor, his investment decision would de-
pend on the expected yield and his capacity for ab-
sorbing risks. The greater that capacity is, the greater 
will be the tendency for the investor to enter into 
games which offer higher expected returns, although 
the risks are higher too. We will assume that this 
capacity is limited by the amount of assets that the 
investor possesses; that is to say, that aversion to risk 
is part of his restrictions and not of his preferences. 
Thus, investors with more assets would take greater 
risks (Figueroa, 1993). 
We will also assume that capital is mobile 
among countries. In this case, how do investors de-
cide which countries to allocate their funds to? In 
order to answer this question, we present an oversim-
plified model here. We shall consider two types of 
risks: product risk and country risk, since the investor 
must decide in what products and in which country to 
invest. In both cases, the investor faces two possible 
situations. In the case of the product, he can obtain 
either a good return (r}) or a bad return (r2). The 
expected return on his investment would thus be: 
i* = P, r, + P2 r2, P,+P2 = l,r1>r2>0 (5) 
where P¡ and P2 can be interpreted as the prob-
abilities that one or the other of these situations will 
take place. 
Let us assume that the private and public 
production factors are complementary. Consequently, 
for given values of probabilities, the expected returns 
will depend on public investment (G). 
In the decision regarding the country, we will 
also assume two situations: in country j there may 
be either socio-political stability or a situation of 
instability and chaos. We will term these probabilities 
Vj and V2 respectively, where V} + V2 = 1. Let us 
assume that if the first situation prevails, the investor 
obtains r*, but if the second one occurs his return will 
be zero. Consequently, his expected return, taking 
into account the country risk effect, would be: 
Kj=Vu? (6) 
In terms of the expected return, the investor 
would invest in the country with the highest value of 
Rej, that is to say, in the country with the greatest 
socio-political stability. 
In the previous model, the expected rate of re-
turn for the product was independent of the country. 
If we relax this assumption, then the return in country 
j would be: 
The investor would still invest in the country 
with the highest value of Pf¡, but now it could happen 
that a country with relative instability (a low value 
of Vj) could nevertheless attract investments because 
the value of r* is relatively high. 
In both models the risk is the same: loss of the 
whole investment if socio-political instability takes 
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place. In other words, the risk consists of the country 
risk factor. If the investor had the capacity to absorb 
this possible loss, he would make his investment in 
the country with the highest value of Re. If he did 
not have that capacity, he would not invest in any 
country at all. 
If we introduce into this system of relations the 
theoretical proposition that the probability of having 
socio-political stability -that is to say, social order-
depends on the degree of equity, this means that the 
return on investment Re would not be independent of 
the degree of equity of society. Hence, as well as 
depending on public investment, private investment 
would also depend on the degree of equity of the 
society (£): that is to say, the investment function 
would assume the following form: 
I =H(G) if E £ E* 
= J (G,E) if E < E* (8) 
where E* is the threshold of socially tolerated equity. 
Private investment could not be independent of 
the degree of equity existing in the society. If the 
degree of equity were above the social tolerance 
threshold, investment would not be affected by 
changes in equity, but if it fell below that threshold or 
were in danger of falling below it, investment would 
go down. The assumption that investors have differ-
ent capacities to absorb losses -different "disaster 
points", as Hicks (1989) would say- is enough to 
generate a curve where the relation between invest-
ment and equity is positive up to E*. The lower the 
degree of equity (and of social stability), the higher 
the risk for the return on investment, so that only big 
investors with capacity to absorb possible losses 
would invest. As E increases, the risk would go down 
and investors with less capacity to absorb losses 
would enter the market. Obviously, beyond E* the 
curve flattens out.2 
Consequently, in a very unequal society the 
system of equations (3), (4) and (8) gives a produc-
tion function with the following form: 
Qt=f (h G(-;- EJ> where E < E* (9) 
2
 It might be supposed that after reaching a high degree of equity 
the curve would take a downward direction, since an excess of 
equity can give rise to disincentives for investors. The curve 
would then have the form of an inverted U. 
The level of production depends on the number 
of workers employed in the same period and also on 
public investment and the level of equity (when this 
is below the social tolerance threshold), both vari-
ables from the preceding period. We can thus say that 
a production process may be more or less "equity 
intensive" compared with another, depending on the 
degree of social stability acceptable to private invest-
ment. The latter depends on how many linkages this 
production process has with the other sectors of the 
economy. The more linkages it has, the greater its 
need for social stability, and hence the more equity-
intensive it will be. 
Investors would seek to exploit the absolute ad-
vantages, comparative advantages or competitive ad-
vantages of the selected country.3 The logic behind 
their decisions would be guided by the model devel-
oped here. But their investments would help to de-
velop those advantages for the future, which would 
give rise to a dynamic effect. When the production 
process for a good is less intensive in terms of social 
stability, the investment may be less sensitive to 
country risk, and investors could seek to produce that 
good in enclaves (mines, oilfields, in-bond assembly 
activities, tourism centres). But if the production 
process in question is intensive in terms of social 
stability, the country risk may have a very substantial 
effect, so that they would not invest in the good in 
question. Because of the country risk factor, under 
which lies the degree of equity, the competitive 
advantages of a country might not be developed and 
its comparative advantages might not evolve. 
In this theoretical formulation, equity results 
from the functioning of the market in the preceding 
period (which naturally operates with exogenous 
variables) and the social policies of the government, 
which is also an exogenous variable. But the theory 
we want to put forward here is that in a society 
whose development process starts from an initial 
condition of marked inequality, this inequality will be 
maintained. The market will not be able to reduce it, 
the political system will have no incentives to do so, 
and the situation of inequality will tend to persist. 
There will thus be a state of pronounced inequality in 
that society. 
3
 In line with Krugman, we will understand competitive ad-
vantages as being those which affect intra-industry trade. 
EQUITY, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS • ADOLFO FIGUE ROA 
C E P A L R E V I E W 65 • A U G U S T 1 9 9 8 51 
A prediction with empirical content can be 
derived from this theoretical system: societies with 
a high degree of inequality will receive little for-
eign direct investment; other conditions being 
equal, a country with greater equity would attract a 
larger proportion of private investment, thereby 
raising its productivity and improving its share in 
the international market. Another empirical predic-
tion which can be derived from this theory is 
that in very unstable economies transnational corpo-
rations (whose capacity to absorb risks is greater 
than that of domestic firms) will have a bigger 
share in total private investment. Both predictions 
are empirically verifiable. 
IV 
Empirical data 
A new set of data on equity presented recently by 
the World Bank (Deininger and Squire, 1996) is 
based on a sample of 108 countries from the 1950s 
to the 1990s, with a total of 682 observations. In this 
sample, Latin America (with 20 countries and 100 
observations) appears as the region with the greatest 
inequality in the whole world (table 1). Its Gini 
coefficient has an average level of 0.50, while that 
of the advanced capitalist countries is 0.33 and that 
of the Asian "Tigers" is around 0.35. This order is 
maintained if the index used is the ratio of the shares 
in total income of the top and bottom quintiles. 
In reality, there are two other interesting results 
which emerge from the data of Deininger and 
Squire (1996, table 1): first, the order of inequality 
among the regions is maintained over time; and sec-
ond, the changes in the Gini coefficients are not radi-
cal within each region.4 These data are consistent 
with our hypothesis of the persistence of pronounced 
inequality when this is an initial condition of the 
economy.5 
4
 Even at the country level, there is noteworthy stability of the 
Gini coefficient: for the countries with more than 10 observa-
tions, the Pearson variability coefficient does not exceed 12%, 
This empirical fact raises some interesting questions: for exam-
ple, is equity a structural characteristic of each society: an initial 
condition which it is hard to modify substantially? 
5
 The famous scientist Alexander Humboldt wrote that one of 
the features which impressed him most in his visits to the Ameri-
cas was the tremendous economic and social inequality. A hun-
dred and fifty years later, we are still talking about this same 
feature as one of the central problems of Latin America. 
TABLE 1 
Indexes of Inequality, by regions, 1947-1995 
(Averages) 
Latin America 
Africa south of the Sahara 
Middle East and North Africa 
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Source: Deininger and Squire, 1996, table 1. 
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TABLE2 
Latin America: Foreign direct Investment 
(Annual averages) 
Billions of dollars 
1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993 
A. All countries 
B. Developing countries 


















Source: ECLAC, 1995, table H.2, p. 53. 
TABLE 3 
Foreign direct Investment flows to Peru and 
to a group of Latin American countries/ 1988-1993 






































































Source: ECLAC, 1995, table IX.4, p. 192. 
a
 Comprising Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
Latin America's share in foreign direct invest-
ment flows has been going down since the first half 
of the 1980s, regardless of whether it is measured 
with respect to all countries or only the developing 
countries (table 2). Peru, which is one of the coun-
tries in the region where economic inequality is most 
pronounced, suffered from marked political insta-
bility in the period from 1988 to 1992. In that 
period, foreign investment only entered the country 
in small amounts, beginning to increase only in 1993 
(table 3). These data are in keeping with our hypothe-
sis that a bigger share of investments goes to the 
more equalitarian societies. 
The relation between equity and investment, 
which is a structural equation in our theoretical 
system (equation (8)), is statistically tested in a study 
by Alesina and Perotti (1993). For a sample of 70 
countries, with data from the period 1960-1985, they 
find a negative correlation between equity and socio-
political instability, on the one hand, and between 
socio-political instability and investment, on the 
other. The 16 Latin American countries included in 
this sample displayed the highest degrees of inequal-
ity and socio-political instability, as well as the 
lowest rates of investment (Alesina and Perotti, 1993, 
tables 4 and 5 and p. 19). 
These authors* interpretation of their results, and 
the policy conclusions they draw from them, suffer 
from a logical difficulty, however. In their model, 
these authors take income distribution as an explana-
tory variable: that is to say, as an exogenous variable 
of the economic process, but there is no economic 
theory that endorses such an assumption. The best 
way of solving this logical difficulty would be to 
consider a theoretical system like that developed 
here, in which investment in the current period de-
pends on the degree of socio-political instability in 
the same period, and in which this latter variable de-
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pends on the degree of equity in the preceding pe-
riod. In this dynamic system, in the absence of data 
on the distribution of asset stocks, income distribu-
tion can be used as an initial condition in the time-
paths of the endogenous variables. 
Indeed, in the statistical analysis made by the 
above-named authors they use the income distribu-
tion at the beginning of the period studied (1960), 
while for the other variables they use the averages for 
the period 1960-1985. But in this case the interpreta-
tion of the results cannot be that which they do in 
fact make: that investment depends on the degree of 
inequality -"income inequality increases political in-
stability, which in turn reduces investment" (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1993, p. 18), for both are endogenous 
variables. If these data are considered to be generated 
by a dynamic system, the causal relation would have 
to be different: that high income concentration, as an 
initial condition, increases the risk of socio-political 
instability, which leads to lower investment and 
growth rates. 
Moreover, Alesina and Perotti's policy conclu-
sions also need to be reformulated. They conclude 
that income redistribution has unpredictable net ef-
fects, since the higher tax pressure needed to secure 
such redistribution would reduce the incentives to in-
vest. This effect may be one of levels and not of 
rates, however. This confusion is similar to that 
which exists when it is considered that international 
trade barriers based on protective tariffs, which are 
also tax rates, constitute a factor affecting economic 
growth. As Lucas (1988, pp. 12 and 13) rightly 
points out, the easing of such barriers could have an 
effect on the level but not on the rate of growth. If we 
adopt Lucas's theory that income distribution affects 
the growth rate, the logical conclusion of Alesina and 
Perotti's study, in the light of our reinterpretation of 
its empirical results, would have to be different: re-
distributing income, as a change in the initial condi-
tions, would give rise to a different path marked by 
higher investment and growth: in other words, it 
would affect the growth rate. 
Judging by its share in world trade, Latin Amer-
ica has lost competitiveness since the 1960s. Table 4 
illustrates this trend very clearly. Between 1960 and 
1992 the region's share in trade fell by more than 
half, from 7.7% to 3.7%. The developed countries 
account for most of world trade and have increased 
their share still further. The group that has in-
creased its competitiveness most markedly, how-
ever, is that of the so-called "Asian Tigers" 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). 
A sample of eight Latin American countries re-
veals the same pattern as for the region as a whole: 
loss of participation in the world market, although 
with differences of degree which are worthy of note 
(table 5). The loss of market shares has been most 
serious in the cases of Argentina and Peru, but less 
severe in Colombia and Costa Rica. Chile lost part of 
its market share between 1964 and 1986 and sub-
sequently began to recover somewhat, although it did 
not manage to recover its market level of the early 
1960s in the period studied. Paraguay has maintained 
its market share almost unchanged over the period, 
albeit with big fluctuations from year to year. Brazil 
registered successes during the period from 1964 to 
1984, but since then it has lost ground and declined 
to levels similar to those of the early 1960s. The 
relatively most successful country is Mexico. It lost 
ground in 1964-1976, made substantial gains in 
1977-1985, only to lose part of its advances between 
1986 and 1989, settling down since then at a level 
somewhat higher than that of the early 1960s. In 
short, the Latin American sample does not include 
any case comparable to that of the "Asian Tigers". 
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V 
The role of resource endowment 
The importance of equity in determining private in-
vestment depends, as we already noted, on the degree 
of integration of the export sector in the national 
economy. Private investment will seek to exploit the 
absolute, relative or competitive advantages, accord-
ing to the country's initial conditions as regards re-
source endowment and equity. A society which only 
has an ample endowment of natural resources, with a 
high degree of initial inequality, could only attract 
investments seeking to exploit its absolute advan-
tages and some of its comparative advantages. With 
such investments, however, it would be hard for the 
country to emerge from its social backwardness. 
A significant endowment of natural resources 
can be counterproductive. A country in such a posi-
tion may find it difficult to develop on the basis of 
absolute advantages. The exploitation of a country's 
absolute advantages does not require that it should 
have socio-political stability. The export activities 
can take place in an enclave. The more integrated the 
export sector is in the productive system of the 
country, however, the more important social order, 
and hence equity, will be for attracting private invest-
ments to develop the export sectors. 
Consequently, societies with a good endowment 
of natural resources will have a higher level of for-
eign investment, for a given degree of inequality in 
the society. This is another empirical prediction of 
the model. 
What kind of goods has Latin America special-
ized in? Throughout almost its entire history, up to 
the late 1970s, the region has specialized mainly in 
primary commodities such as those produced by the 
mining, petroleum, fishery and agricultural sectors; 
only in recent decades has it developed exports of 
manufactures (table 6). 
With primary commodities, the region is exporting 
its abundant natural resources endowment, including its 
climatic advantages. Its deposits of minerals and petro-
leum enable it to export those products, while thanks to 
its biodiversity it can export fishery products, coca, 
coffee, cotton, sugar, asparagus, llama wool: in other 
words, goods that cannot be produced just anywhere in 
the world or at just any time of year. Tourism also 
represents the export of a natural resource based on 
the climate or historical remains. 
A combination of absolute and comparative ad-
vantages lies at the basis of this specialization. Ex-
cept in the case of some agricultural products, 
however, the exploitation of these natural resources 
has not meant that the region exports goods making 
intensive use of labour, which is its relatively most 
abundant factor. Minerals, metals and fuels make 
relatively more intensive use of capital. Through 
them, Latin America is exporting goods with a high 
rate of return. Thus, a considerable part of its exports 
do not depend on variations in international prices, or 
the exchange rate, or wages, at least to a significant 
extent, but on investment. 
Agricultural production, which makes relatively 
intensive use of labour (especially unskilled labour), 
has lost relative importance in the region's exports 
(table 6). In absolute terms, the data show that the 
volume of agricultural exports grew by 4% per year 
in the 1970s, but this rate went down to 2.3% in the 
1980s (ECLAC, 1995, p. 70). 
Although there has been an expansion in exports 
of manufactures throughout the region, the data in 
table 6 conceal marked differences between coun-
tries. Almost 75% of exports of manufactures in 1993 
were accounted for by Brazil and Mexico alone 
(ECLAC, 1995, table III.5, p. 77). Without these coun-
tries, the simple average for the region is only 18% 
instead of the 39% shown in the table. 
Within manufacturing activity, there is a tra-
ditional goods sector which is relatively labour-
intensive: textiles, clothing and footwear. In this 
sector, the relative abundance of labour seems to play 
an important role in competitiveness. The location of 
in-bond assembly activities for these products by 
transnational corporations in various countries of the 
region appears to be based precisely on the existence 
of cheap labour. 
There are not sufficient data to prove the hy-
pothesis that investments in primary sectors require 
less socio-political stability, but there is a story 
which serves to illustrate this hypothesis. Cusiana, 
in Colombia, is the biggest oil deposit found in Latin 
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TABLE 6 
Agricultural products 











































Source: ECLAC, 1995, table 1.6, p. 39. 
America in the last twenty years and involves an in-
vestment of US$6 billion. The oil company in ques-
tion, which was foreign, had to interrupt its 
prospecting work on a number of occasions because 
the guerrilla movements invaded and destroyed its 
installations, and soldiers have been stationed in 
Cusiana to drive the guerrilla out (El Comercio, 
1996, p. E6). This oilfield will be put into operation 
immediately, even though Colombia is a country 
plagued by poverty, political chaos, guerrilla activi-
ties and dope trafficking. It would appear that there 
are no prior requisites in terms of socio-political sta-
bility for exploiting oilfields: they operate as physical 
and economic enclaves. 
The other hypothesis is that different factor en-
dowments give rise to different patterns of trade and 
different degrees of distributive equity. More specifi-
cally, investments which develop an export sector based 
on the exploitation of natural resources are likely to lead 
to greater income concentration. This hypothesis was 
empirically tested by Bourguignon and Morrisson 
(1989, chapter II) in a cross-sectional analysis for 
1970. The sample included twenty developing coun-
tries, of which six were in Latin America (Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay). 
For its statistical analysis, the study by Bour-
guignon and Morrisson included income distribution 
as an endogenous variable (measured through the 
shares of selected deciles in national income), while 
the exogenous variables were the degree of trade pro-
tection, the weight of agricultural exports and exports 
of minerals and petroleum products in the gross do-
mestic product, the structure of land ownership, and 
education. The results show that protection has a 
negative effect on equity, as also does specialization 
based on natural resources, except when agricultural 
exports come mainly from small farms. Trade pat-
terns based on absolute advantages lead to concentra-
tion of income, while those based on comparative 
advantages in agriculture depend on the degree of 
concentration of land ownership. 
These results can be re-interpreted in the light of 
our theory: inequitable societies well endowed with 
natural resources will attract investments aimed 
mainly at exploiting their natural resources, so that 
they will continue to be inequitable and unstable. 
This mechanism leads to the maintenance of the 
initial condition of highly unequal societies. 
From this theoretical standpoint, public social ex-
penditure may be seen as a means of establishing mini-
mum floor levels for the income and well-being of the 
population, thus giving stability to the social and politi-
cal system. These actions may be termed "social 
policy". This floor level would have to be established 
as a set of rights, however: a redistribution of income 
to finance economic rights. This means that the 
goods and services in question would have to be 
withdrawn from the play of the market forces and 
political and electoral interests. Social stability, like 
democracy, is a public good: once it has been estab-
lished, no-one can be excluded from its consumption. 
It is therefore clear that public social expenditure is a 
form of investment in a public good: social stability. 
The Latin American experience has not moved 
in this direction, however. An ECLAC study (1994) 
shows that in the 1980s and early 1990s social ex-
penditure in a group of countries in the region did not 
amount to a significant proportion of their GDP, the 
variations in such expenditure were not anti-cyclical 
with respect to changes in GDP, and it did not have 
significantly progressive effects on distribution. 
Clearly, the prevailing political system has not used 
social policy to change the situation of marked in-
equality observed in most Latin American countries. 
This empirical result is also consistent with the the-
ory proposed in this article. 
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VI 
Conclusions 
The question which has been the guiding theme of 
the present study is whether a society can become 
developed even though it starts with a high degree of 
inequality and, in particular, whether a country can 
be competitive in the international economy regard-
less of its present degree of inequality. 
If the initial conditions of an economy are a no-
table natural resource endowment and a high degree 
of inequality, private investment will be directed to-
wards exploiting those resources and producing them 
in enclaves. With such initial conditions, it is unlikely 
that the investment will lead to the development of 
comparative and competitive advantages. Thus, inter-
national trade will not help to reduce the excess la-
bour that the economy may have, nor will inequality 
be reduced through trade. 
If there were any relation between trade and eq-
uity, it would be rather in the opposite direction: in 
order to develop comparative and competitive advan-
tages, a country must have quite a low degree of 
inequality. The logic followed by investors would 
lead them to place their investments in countries with 
socio-political stability, which would depend on the 
degree of equity of society. Exports do not induce 
economic growth, as is usually claimed; exports are 
endogenous. It is investment which generates growth 
and higher productivity, so that the country increases 
in competitiveness. And the more intensive in their 
requirements for social order are the goods that a 
country exports, the greater will be the effect of 
equity on its net exports. The international competi-
tiveness of a country depends on its degree of equity: 
that is the theory which has been developed in the 
present article. 
When empirically tested, the theory shows an 
acceptable degree of consistency with the data for 
Latin America. One prediction of this theory is that 
the economic performance of countries depends on 
their initial degree of equity and factor endowment. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Latin America started 
with pronounced inequality and an abundant endow-
ment of natural resources and unskilled labour; South 
Korea and Taiwan, in contrast, started with the oppo-
site conditions: greater equity and an endowment of 
human capital. The evolution of our region and of 
those two Asian countries in terms of growth, equity 
and competitiveness has been as predicted by the 
theory: nowadays we talk about "Asian Tigers" but 
not "Latin American Tigers". 
Another prediction of the theory which is in 
keeping with the actual trends displayed by the 
world economy is that long-term capital flows tend to 
go preferably to the more equalitarian countries. At 
the present time, there is greater world economic in-
tegration, especially in the financial field. Exchange-
rate controls have been abandoned and the capital 
markets have been globalized. According to a study 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), world foreign direct invest-
ment flows have increased in recent decades at un-
precedented rates, three to five times greater than the 
growth rate of international trade flows (Oman, 1996, 
p. 26). This indicates that countries (including those of 
the Third World) cannot be viewed as being different in 
terms of their capital endowments, since capital can 
now be considered as being internationally mobile. 
In short, the relative levels of productivity of 
countries (what we defined here as long-term com-
petitiveness) depend on the distribution of invest-
ments among them; these investments depend on 
public investment and on the degree of socio-politi-
cal stability of the recipient countries, which in turn 
depends on equity. Hence, competitiveness depends 
on equity. Since socio-political stability requires a 
certain degree of organization of society in order to 
maintain an acceptable level of equity, competitive-
ness is clearly not just a question of microeconomic 
or sectoral efficiency, nor is it merely a question of 
the macroeconomic balances: it is also a social ques-
tion. Societies compete with each other to attract pri-
vate investment in order to become competitive, and 
the factors in this competition include their degree of 
equity. 
(Original: Spanish). 
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